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BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD IN CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS AND WAIVER OF JURISDICTIONAL
OBJECTION -SOMMER V. BOROVIC
The rise in divorce rates and the increased mobility of present-day
society makes the choice of the most appropriate jurisdiction in a
child custody dispute one of great importance. Problems in deter-
mining whether a given court has jurisdiction in a child custody mod-
ification proceeding are most readily apparent within the framework
of an interstate conflict. No uniform guidelines exist 1 and, con-
sequently, the litigation is characterized by confusion and uncer-
tainty. 2 Further aggravating the problem is the legalized kidnapping
1. The argument for establishing uniform guidelines has been criticized and rejected by
commentators and courts alike. In Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 763, 197 P.2d 739
(1948), the California Supreme Court rejected any "hard and fast rules" in allocating jurisdiction
and upheld the principle of concurrent jurisdiction. Concurrent jurisdiction is defined as the
jurisdiction of several different tribunals, each authorized to deal with the same subject matter
at the choice of the suitor. Mackinaw Drainage Dist. v. Martin, 242 I1. App. 139, 143 (3d Dist.
1926), aff'd, 325 Il1. 400, 156 N.E. 274 (1927). In support of the California court's position,
many commentators urge that courts assume jurisdiction without regard to legalistic formulas
whenever the welfare of the child so requires. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 87-89, at 288-300 (1962); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody
Decrees: Law and Reason v. the Restatement, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345 (1953); Stansbury, Custody
and Maintenance Law Across State Lines, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 819 (1944); Stumberg,
The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 42, 53-58 (1940); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (1971). Practically speaking, many jurisdictions
have followed this suggestion. Courts have abandoned any pretense of being guided by absolute
doctrines which are either too rigid in requiring recognition and enforcement of custody decrees
without regard to the child's welfare, see, e.g., Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92
S.E.2d 71 (1956) (court refused to adjudicate custody issue when child was removed from juris-
diction even after custodial parent was served with notice of proceeding), or too flexible in
permitting non-recognition and non-enforcement in favor of a "fugitive" parent. See, e.g., Hal-
verson v. Halverson, 42 I11. App.2d 284, 291, 192 N.E.2d 258, 261-62 (1st Dist. 1963) (modifica-
tion based on change of circumstances). See also A. EHRENZWEIC, A TREATISE ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 87-89, at 289-92, 297-300 (1962).
In the alternative, several jurisdictions have adopted the Independent Investigation rule
and claimed absolute discretion in examining the merits of child custody decrees. The Kansas
Supreme Court maintains that since the court is obligated to secure the best interests of the
child, former adjudication is evidentiary only and not controlling. Moyer v. Moyer, 171 Kan.
495, 233 P.2d 711 (1951). See also Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948);
People ex rel. Herzog v. Morgan, 287 N.Y. 317, 39 N.E.2d 255 (1942); Comment, Jurisdiction
in Kansas Child Custody Cases, 8 WASHBuRN L.J. 48 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proccedings-Problems of
California Law, 23 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1971); Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial
Fights: The Case for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011
(1977); Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795 (1964); Comment,
The Jurisdiction of Texas Courts in Interstate Child Custody Disputes: A Functional Approach,
54 TEX. L. REV. 1008 (1976).
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of children by their parents. Principles of concurrent jurisdiction '
and failure to grant full faith and credit to child custody decrees
4
encourage parents to forum shop in hopes of finding a sympathetic
jurisdiction. 5
Similar problems have arisen in predominantly intrastate controver-
sies involving the modification of child custody decrees. Recognizing
its obligation to secure the best interests of the child in any custody
proceeding, 6 the Illinois Supreme Court in Sommer v. Borovic 7 held
3. See note 1 supra.
4. While the Supreme Court has not expressly rejected the notion that the full faith and
credit clause applies to child custody decrees, it has failed to speak directly on that issue when
the opportunity to do so has arisen. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (failing to decide
case on grounds of full faith and credit, the Supreme Court held that res judicata did not bar
South Carolina court from making an independent investigation as the Virginia decree was
based solely on an agreement between the parties); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958) (full
faith and credit clause did not prevent North Carolina from modifying New York custody decree
based on subsequent change in circumstances); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (Ohio
court was not bound to give full faith and credit to a Wisconsin custody decree entered without
having first obtained in personam jurisdiction over the defendant); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.
610 (1947) (full faith and credit clause did not prevent New York court from modifying Florida
decree in accordance with the law in Florida). See also Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to
Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 89 (1964) (decision that custody decrees
are entitled to full faith and credit would be improper, amounting to judicial legislation);
Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959) (best
interests of child served by ignoring sister state decrees); Comment, The Full Faith and Credit
Clause and Its Relation to Custody Decrees, 11 ALA. L. REV. 139 (1958) (application of the full
faith and credit clause necessitates a test of uniform national application such as substantially
changed circumstances or facts substantially affecting child's welfare); Comment, Full Faith and
Credit to Judgments: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 282,
287-91 (1966) (Second Restatement is the least desirable alternative as a practical solution to
problems of child custody).
5. See Foster, Domestic Relations, 1960-1961 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 23 U. PI'mr. L.
REV. 465, 476-79 (1961); Fox, Domestic Relations, 1963-1964 Survey of Pennsylvania Law, 26
U. PiTT. L. REV. 363, 377 (1964). Both comment that "legalized abduction" of a child by his or
her parent is encouraged by the majority position's refusal to grant full faith and credit to
custody decrees. As a result, forum shopping is likewise encouraged.
6. As stated by Judge Cardozo when writing for the majority in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y.
429, 433, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925):
The chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction upon petition does not proceed upon
the theory that the petitioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of action
against the other or indeed against anyone. He acts as tarens patriae to do what is
best for the interest of the child.
See also Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 415, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952); Lyon, Awarding Custody of
Children in Illinois-Review of the Factors Considered by the Courts, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 42,
44 (1961).
Since the passage of the new Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101-802 (1977), the Illinois judiciary in determining the child's best interest
has been instructed to consider all relevant factors, with particular attention paid to the follow-
ing:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
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that the court which originally determines custody retains exclusive
jurisdiction over the child, and that the parents or guardian of the
child may not subsequently waive that restriction on jurisdiction by
seeking to modify the custody degree in a court of a different county.
In other words, appearance and participation in the modification pro-
ceeding of any county court other than that court which issued the
original custody decree will not deprive the decretal court of its juris-
diction, since only the decretal court may entertain petitions for
modification.
The Illinois judiciary has long recognized that the jurisdiction of
the decretal court is continuing.8 The decretal court's continuing
jurisdiction to modify a decree does not in itself preclude any other
court from litigating the same matter, and does not require that a
modification proceeding be brought in the decretal court if both par-
ties agree otherwise. The courts had generally avoided using manda-
tory language and taking an absolutist approach. 9 However, a trend
evolved which gradually gave acceptance to the principle that the de-
cretal court's jurisdiction is exclusive as well as continuing. In support
of the exclusive jurisdiction principle, an Illinois Appellate Court in
Kohler v. Kohler 10 stated that "an application to enforce or modify a
siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
Id. § 602(a). Section 602(b) also points out that the court may not consider conduct of the
present or proposed cutodian that does not affect his relationship to the child. For a criticism of
the best interest standard as it is applied in Illinois custody proceedings, see Taylor, Child
Custody Problems in Illinois, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 521 (1975). See also Schiller, Child Custody:
Evolution of Current Criteria, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 241 (1977) (discussion of the need to enact
legislation which provides objective criteria and frees the court of evidentiary and procedural
formalities).
7. 69 Ill.2d 220, 370 N.E.2d 1028 (1977).
8. See Draper v. Draper, 68 Ill. 17 (1873). The decretal court does not lose its continuing
jurisdiction upon the death of one party, Stafford v. Stafford, 299 Ill. 438, 132 N.E. 452 (1921),
or if a party or the child moves outside the court's geographic jurisdiction. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77
I11. App.2d 295, 22 N.E.2d 340 (4th Dist. 1966). See also Annot., 70 A.L.R. 526 (1931). But see
Houghland v. Leonard, 415 I11. 135, 112 N.E.2d 697 (1953) (prior and continuing jurisdiction of
circuit court issuing divorce decree over child did not prevent county court from assuming
jurisdiction of proceedings under Juvenile Court Act); Burr v. Fahey, 230 I11. App. 143 (1st
Dist. 1923) (jurisdiction of superior court issuing divorce decree does not deprive county court
of jurisdiction to enter a decree of adoption).
9. This practice may have been due in part to the fact that nowhere in Section 19 of the
Divorce Act (relied upon by the judiciary in the past but since repealed) did the legislature
state that the decretal court is the only court with jurisdiction to modify a custody decree.
Section 19 reads in part as follows: "The court may, on application, from time to time, make
such alterations in the . . . custody . . . of the children, as shall appear reasonable and proper."
Law of July 27, 1949, ch. 40, § 19, 1949 Ill. Laws 729 (repealed 1977).
10. 326 I11. App. 105, 61 N.E.2d 687 (4th Dist. 1945).
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decree for custody or support of minor children in a divorce case
must be made in the court where the decree was rendered." "
Thereafter, it generally was conceded that the decretal court's juris-
diction was "continuous and at least arguably exclusive." 12
Sommer v. Borovic appears to be the first Illinois Supreme Court
case to speak on the issue of continuing and exclusive jurisdiction,
thereby enabling the Illinois practitioner to ascertain with absolute
certainty the court having custody jurisdiction. This Note will analyze
the policy considerations behind the court's adoption of an absolutist
approach in an area of law requiring, in the opinion of many jurists,
the utmost of flexibility in decision making. 13 It also will discuss the
alternative approach suggested by the dissenting opinion. Finally, the
propriety of the majority's position will be emphasized by pinpointing
the inadequacies of the dissenters' argument.
Sommer v. Borovic: THE STRUGGLE FOR CUSTODY
The controversy giving rise to the court's decision in Sommer
emerged from a complicated fact situation which generally typifies
child custody proceedings. 14 In short, the divorce decree awarding
custody to the mother was entered by the DuPage County Court
and, sometime thereafter, a petition to modify the original decree was
filed in Lake County by the father. 15  The mother acquiesced to the
Lake County court's jurisdiction and participated in the modification
proceeding for over a year before she first questioned the Lake
County court's power to resolve the dispute. 16 In the interim, con-
11. Id. at 110, 61 N.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added).
12. Crawley v. Bauchens, 13 Ill. App.3d 791, 795, 300 N.E.2d 603, 607 (5th Dist. 1973).
13. Commentators have criticized judicial opinions which decide a question of custody by
mere reference to generalizations designed to guide courts without an examination of the
specifics of the cases. See generally Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of Vague and Indefinite
Standards, 5 J. FAM. L. 21 (1965); Taylor, supra note 6.
14. See, e.g., In re Giblin, 304 Minn. 510, 232 N.W.2d 214 (1975); Crawley v. Bauchens,
13 Ill. App.3d 791, 300 N.E.2d 603 (5th Dist. 1973). Custody battles have been characterized as
transcending "the brutality and irregularity of guerilla warfare." Hazard, supra note 4, at 392.
15. The mother to whom custody was awarded later remarried and, with the court's permis-
sion, moved with her children to New Jersey. Subsequently, she and the children's father, Dr.
Sommer, agreed that their youngest daughter would live temporarily with her father in Illinois.
Some months later, the mother requested return of the daughter, but the father refused. It was
at this point that Dr. Sommer filed a petition for modification in Lake County.
16. The mother filed a general appearance and counter-claimed for child support payments
in arrears and for an increase in future payments. After a hearing, custody was awarded to the
father. Thereafter, the mother instituted an action in the New Jersey courts and eventually filed
in Lake County an "emergency petition for change of child custody." Finally, she moved to
vacate the Lake County custody order for want of jurisdiction. Sommer v. Borovic, 69 Ill.2d
220, 226, 370 N.E.2d 1028, 1029 (1977).
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siderable child-snatching resulted in the child being taken from Il-
linois to New Jersey and finally back to Illinois again. 17  Thereafter,
the mother turned to the DuPage County court, the court which en-
tered the original decree, and sought relief from an adverse custody
decree entered in Lake County.
Eventually, a dispute arose between DuPage County and Lake
County over the validity of court orders issued by both.' 8 The con-
troversy ended when the matter, on a writ of mandamus, was
brought before the Illinois Supreme Court, which clearly established
that the jurisdiction of the decretal court was continuing and exclu-
sive. The court stated that the child custody decree was an inter-
locutory order, not a final one. Therefore, the doctrine of prior juris-
diction and the orderly administration of justice precluded any other
court in the state from later exercising jurisdiction over the same
subject matter. 19
The court's holding was dictated by its obligation in a child custody
proceeding to secure the best interests of the child. 20 This duty
17. When the child's father refused her mother's request to return their daughter to New
Jersey, the mother removed the child herself in violation of the Lake County custody decree.
After the mother initiated proceedings in New Jersey and the New Jersey court denied the
father's motion to dismiss, he removed the child from New Jersey and brought her back to
Illinois.
18. The Lake County court declared the mother in contempt of court when she removed
her daughter from Illinois and brought the child back to New Jersey. On the other hand, the
DuPage County court placed the mother "under protective order" of the court, declared the
contempt order void, and enjoined the sheriffs of Lake and DuPage counties from attempting to
enforce the order. Moreover, it enjoined Dr. Sommer from proceeding further in the Lake
County court. Consequently, he sought relief in the Illinois Supreme Court.
19. While the Illinois Supreme Court made very clear that the principle of exclusive juris-
diction is based on principles of comity, other jurisdictions have not done the same. In depriv-
ing any court other than the decretal court of jurisdiction, many courts do not distinguish be-
tween a total lack of subject matter jurisdiction and judicial restraint. The distinction is worth
making since it is foreseeable that circumstances would arise making an exercise of jurisdiction
advisable. This would be the case in emergency situations involving child abuse or abandon-
ment of a child. If the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction entirely deprived a non-decretal court of
power, the court would be precluded from exercising jurisdiction in such emergency situations.
And with respect to the waiver problem, parties would never be permitted to consent to the
jurisdiction of another county court, since a stipulation of the parties can never confer jurisdic-
tion where the power to act is involved. See Annot., 146 A.L.R. 1153, 1155-57 (1943).
20. The "best interest of the child" standard has been subject to considerable attack as being
unconstitutionally vague. One court, in In re Adoption of JS.R., 374 A.2d 860 (D.C. App.
1977), while recognizing that the concept lacked precise meaning, upheld its validity and com-
mented that:
the standard "best interest of the child" requires the judge ... to make an in-
formed and rational judgment, free of bias and favor, as to the least detrimental of
the available alternatives. . . .No more precision appears possible. In this context,
no more is constitutionally required.
Id. at 863 (citations and footnotes omitted). In defining "best interests," the court's focus on the
least detrimental alternative is not without support. Legal commentators have pinpointed the
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arises, the court stated, because the children of divorced parents are
wards of the state. 21 Reiterating a well-accepted principle, the court
ruled that, after submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the de-
cretal court, parties could not bind the court on the question of what
was in the best interest of the child by either their agreements 22 or
their actions. 23  Therefore, the mother could not waive the jurisdic-
tional objection. 24 To confer upon the court in Lake County jurisdic-
inadequacies of the "in-the-best-interest-of-the-child" standard and called for reliance on the
"least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and development." J.
GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53 (1973).
The former has been criticized for its failure to impress upon the judiciary the fact that the child
is already a victim of his environmental circumstances and that time is of the essence to avoid
further harm to healthy psychological development. Moreover, it often balances the child's
interest against those of his competing parents, subordinating his needs to adult wishes and
rights. Consequently, the best interest standard should be replaced by the following:
that specific placement and procedure for placement which maximizes, in accord
with the child's sense of time and on the basis of short term predictions given the
limitations of knowledge, his or her opportunity for being wanted and for maintain-
ing on a continuous basis a relationship with at least one adult who is or will be-
come his psychological parent.
Id. at 53-54. For a review of the book's effect on American courts, see Time, Sept. 30, 1974, at
65. See also Plant, The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 805, 816 (1944).
21. See also Crawley v. Bauchens, 13 Ill. App.3d 791, 795, 300 N.E.2d 603, 606 (5th Dist.
1973).
22. As the court in Kminek v. Kminek, 27 Ill. App.3d 78, 83, 325 N.E.2d 741, 745 (1st
Dist. 1975) pointed out, child custody agreements do not provide a "straightjacket" for the court
in determining the best interests of the child. Yet, when the terms of such agreements are
consistent with the child's welfare, they will be given effect. The agreements have probative
value and are persuasive in reaching a final decision.
23. With their actions litigants often attempt to bind the court on procedural matters, as did
the parents in Sommer. The court illustrates the futility of such endeavors by citing Emrich v.
McNeil, 126 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1942). In that case, the original divorce decree was entered in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, the mother filed
suit against the father in the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia to collect child sup-
port payments in arrears. The court held that as long as the child and her parents remained
subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court, principles of prior jurisdiction and public policy
demanded that it determine all questions of custody and support.
24. In Johnson v. Johnson, 185 Tenn. 400, 206 S.W.2d 400 (1947), the divorce decree en-
tered in the Union County court awarded custody to the father, who later filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in Anderson County alleging that the mother was illegally withholding the
child. No jurisdictional objection was raised, the matter was litigated, and custody was awarded
to the mother. On appeal, the court vacated the lower court order and warned that no definite
or orderly settlement of custody could be achieved if either parent were free to invoke the
jurisdiction of any county court in disregard of previous decrees entered by other courts of the
state. Without some element of finality, the child becomes the hapless victim of the litigation.
In Benson v. Benson, 121 Mont. 439, 193 P.2d 827 (1948), the mother was awarded custody
by a divorce decree entered by the Roosevelt County court. She later filed a writ of habeas
corpus in the Sheridan County court after the father failed to return their son at the end of
summer vacation. The father filed a general appearance, evidence was introduced by both par-
ents, and the court affirmed the original custody order. On appeal, the Montana Supreme
Court concluded that since no appeal was taken from the original decree, it was binding not
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tion to modify the decree would thereby prevent the DuPage County
court from doing the same.
OBJECTIVES IN ALLOCATING CUSTODY JURISDICTION
An examination of why the court took an absolutist approach in
allocating jurisdiction and refused to allow waiver leads to an analysis
of the policy considerations supporting the decisions. These consider-
ations, which must be taken into account in allocating child custody
jurisdiction, are numerous and often are at odds with one another.
Those considerations most frequently cited include: (1) stability of en-
vironment and affection relationships; (2) fair venue; (3) maximum ac-
cessibility to evidence; (4) correct decision making; (5) prevention of
custody decree violation; (6) prevention of maltreatment or abuse; and
(7) certainty of determining which court has jurisdiction. 25 Inherent
in any attempt to secure one objective is the risk of sacrificing
another.26
The court in Sharpe v. Sharpe27 faced that very dilemma and bal-
anced the objectives in allocating jurisdiction in favor of a "single
court" theory. 28 Although the problem presented in Sharpe involved
an interstate conflict, 29 the legal theory underlying the court's deci-
only on the parties but on the courts as well. The decretal court retains jurisdiction to deter-
mine questions of child custody to the exclusion of all other courts in the same state.
25. Other important objectives are fair notice and prevention of relitigation. See Ratner,
supra note 2, at 808-10; Comment, The Jurisdiction of Texas Courts in Interstate Child Custody
Disputes: A Functional Approach, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1008, 1009 (1976); UNIFORM CHILD CUS-
TODY JURISDICTION ACT § 1.
26. All action taken by any court awarding child custody must be governed by a concern for
the welfare of the child. Once the initial decision of the court is made, the chancery court does
not lose its power to make any necessary adjustments when a change in circumstance demands
it. However, this notion of non-finality and modifiability is not necessarily in the best interests
of the child, since " 'a child can handle almost anything better than he can handle instability.' "
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children
Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1208-09 (1969), quoting PROCEEDINGS
OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM DIVORCE AND MARRIAGE ACT, NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 98, 101 (Dec. 15-16, 1968) (statement of A.
Watson). Hence, a conflict actually may exist between judicial practice and attempts to secure
the child's best interests. Bodenheimer, supra, at 1209-10. See also Taylor, supra note 6, at
530-31.
27. 77 Ill. App.2d 295, 222 N.E.2d 340 (4th Dist. 1966).
28. Id. at 299, 222 N.E.2d at 342.
29. Unfortunately, the Illinois judiciary may be inconsistent in its reasoning when resolving
interstate custody disputes. Having given lip service to the "single court" theory, it should
follow that Illinois would expect another state to give full faith and credit to an Illinois custody
decree if the court order is to be at all effective. Otherwise, numerous modification orders
would be entered; if there were a change in circumstances that warranted modification in Il-
linois, there would be grounds for modification in another state. In essence, Illinois expects the
state in which the child and his custodian are located to refrain from exercising jurisdiction to
19781
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:853
sion is indicative of the Illinois judiciary's position on the priority
given objectives in allocating jurisdiction. The court was to determine
which theory of child custody jurisdiction should prevail: jurisdiction
based on domicile or jurisdiction based on the principle that the court
first acquiring jurisdiction retains it. The court realized that the
former ensures that the custody determination be made by the court
most likely to decide correctly. In other words, the home state would
be in the best position to determine the child's custody.30 Balanced
against this objective of correct decision making was the court's con-
cern for continuity. Acceptance of the "single court" theory prevents
forum shopping, which the court cited as being at war with the sta-
bility of the court's decree and, therefore, the stability of the child's
environment. Moreover, it recognized the need of parties to be able
to ascertain with reasonable certainty the tribunal with the authority
to resolve controversies involving child custody.31
The propriety of assigning priority to continuity and stability in
balancing objectives in allocating jurisdiction is justified by a court's
obligation to secure the best interests of the child. Continuity-of-af-
fection relationships 32 and stability of environment 3 3 long have been
modify the decree. However, when situations are reversed, the Illinois judiciary does not feel
compelled to do the same. The decree of a sister state is res judicata as to facts then existing,
but not as to subsequent facts. Therefore, Illinois courts are empowered to litigate a dispute if
the modification proceeding is based on change in circumstances. People v. Schaedel, 340 II1.
560, 173 N.E. 172 (1930). See generally Stansbury, supra note 1, at 825-28 (discussion of the
problems inherent in the theory of continuing jurisdiction); Goodrich, Custody of Children in
Divorce Suits, 7 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1921) (argument in support of the continuing jurisdiction of
decretal court).
30. However, the court also noted that domicile is an ambiguous and technical term in-
volving the conflict of laws. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 I11. App.2d 295, 298, 222 N.E.2d 340, 341
(4th Dist. 1966). The concept has been criticized by the courts and academicians alike as being
too rigid and yet too flexible in its application, and one which has little practical concern for the
child's welfare. See note 1 supra. But see May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (necessity of retaining the concept to preserve the federal system until a more
suitable replacement is discovered).
31. See also Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 I11. App.2d 295, 297, 222 N.E.2d 340, 342 (4th Dist.
1966).
32. During the period of development, the instability of all mental processes must be offset
by uninterrupted support from external sources. Smooth growth is arrested when upheavals in
the external world are added to internal trauma. A child will experience regression in affection
relationships, skill achievements, and social adaptation when there are changes of a parent fig-
ure. The younger the child, the less able he is to deal with any change in routine or break in
relationship with his psychological parent. Therefore, disruptions of continuity have different
consequences for different ages. For instance, change of the caretaking person for infants and
toddlers will cause setbacks in the quality of their next attachments. With every break in the
continuity-of-affection relationship, emotional attachments become increasingly distrustful, shal-
low, and indiscriminate. For children under the age of five, disruption of continuity affects
achievements which develop in the intimate exchange with a stable parent figure (communica-
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recognized as "the first and foremost requirements for the child's
health and proper growth."3a The court in a recent Illinois case,
Kminek v. Kminek, 35 based its refusal to uproot the children from the
custody of their father on the theory that stability of environment was
an important factor in determining the best interests of the child. 36
The court warned that care must be taken to prevent shuttling the
children between contesting parents. 37
Just as there is concern about the shuttling of children from one
parent to another through modification decrees, 38 there is also con-
tion skills, toilet training, etc.). If the achievement has been acquired recently, it is easier for
the child to lose it. See J. GOLDSTEIN et al., supra note 20, at 17-20, 32-34.
33. See also H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 11.5, at 326 (1968); Hudak,
Seize, Run, and Sue: The Ignominy of Interstate Child Custody Litigation in American Courts,
39 Mo. L. REV. 521, 523-24 (1974); Plant, supra note 20, at 812-16; Watson, The Children of
Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 64, 71 (1969);
Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceed-
ings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 450 (1976).
34. Bodenheimer, supra note 26, at 1208. The implication of such guidelines is that custody
decrees should be final and irrevocable. See J. GOLDSTEIN et al., supra note 20, at 35; A.
WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 197 (1968); Goldstein & Glitter, Abolition of Grounds for
Divorce: A Model Statute and Commentary, 3 FAM. L.Q. 75, 88 (1969). If not permanent,
custody decrees should remain unchangeable for a specified period of time, such as one or two
years. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 610(a) (1977) generally, no modification for a
two year period); R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS 237 (1969). This approach is justified in light of the abuses which have taken place in
some instances. See, e.g., Hixson v. Hixson, 199 Or. 559, 263 P.2d 597 (1953) (father filed sixty
to seventy separate documents in regard to custody); Allen v. Allen, 200 Or. 678, 268 P.2d 358
(1954) (children of tender years exposed to seven different custody contentions between parents
in nine years in courts of three states).
35. 27 II. App.3d 78, 325 N.E.2d 741 (1st Dist. 1975). This controversy focused on the
modification of a custody decree after both parents signed an agreement awarding permanent
custody to the father. After a court order was entered in accordance with the parents agree-
ment, the mother claimed that she interpreted the signed agreement "making it legal" to be
temporary in nature and that entry of a modification order violated her procedural due process
rights since she received no notice of its presentation to the court. In rejecting both arguments,
the court upheld the judgment, giving custody to the father.
36. The court gave priority to the stability factor when faced with the mother's countervail-
ing arguments based on the tender years doctrine. The latter presumes that the best interests of
minor children are served when placed with the mother. People v. Bukovich, 39 11.2d 76, 83,
233 N.E.2d 382, 386 (1968). While it recognized that Illinois is an advocate of the doctrine, the
court concluded that custody could be given to the father under some circumstances, as in the
instant case in which the mother voluntarily agreed to relinquish custody to the father.
See also Spencer v. Spencer, 132 I11. App.2d 740, 743, 270 N.E.2d 72, 74 (1st Dist. 1971).
37. See also Collings v. Collings, 120 III. App.2d 125, 128, 256 N.E.2d 108, 109 (2d Dist.
1970) (court cautioned that permanent custody decrees should not be subject to constant or
spasmodic variation, and denied father's petition for modification which was based on the admit-
ted adulterous conduct of mother); Szczawinski v. Szczawinski, 37 III. App.2d 350, 353, 185
N. E.2d 375, 377 (1962) (court held that the contumacy of the mother would not justify punish-
ment of the child through alteration of the original decree); Taylor, supra note 6, at 521.
38. Evidence of this concern can be found in Section 610(a) of the Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act, which provides for the following:
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cern about self-help remedies 39 employed by disappointed parents
which results in the legalized kidnapping of children.40 While many
states refuse to exempt parents from criminal responsibility under
state kidnapping statutes if violation of a custody decree results, 41
there are few if any convictions under current law, as a result of a
"hands-off" policy taken by many jurisdictions.4 2  Emphasis on the
No motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier then 2 years after its
date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits that there is
reason to believe the child's present environment may endanger seriously his physi-
cal, mental, moral, or emotional health.
ILL. REV. STAT. 40, § 610 (1977). As the court emphasized in King v. Vancil,
34 I11. App.3d 831, 341 N.E.2d 65 (5th Dist. 1975), children and parents "are entitled to a
certain degree of finality and conclusiveness when an order of custody is entered"; custody,
being "the most important aspect of divorce," should not be subject to frequent modifications.
Id. at 834-35, 341 N.E.2d 68.
39. As Justice Jackson aptly points out in his dissent in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 539
(1953), "A state of the law such as this, where possession apparently is not merely nine points of
the law but all of them and self-help the ultimate authority, has little to commend it in legal
logic or as a principle of order in a federal system." See also Prefatory Note to UNIFORM CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT at iii; Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The
Case for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011 (1977); Note,
Domestic Relations-Criminal Sanctions Against "Child-Snatching" in North Carolina, 55 N.C.
L. REV. 1275, 1285 (1977).
40. In Note, The Problem of Parental Kidnapping, 10 Wyo. L.J. 225, 225-26 (1956), a
distinction is made between kidnapping and child stealing statutes. Kidnapping, as it is com-
monly defined, is the unlawful taking and carrying away of a person by force or fraud and
against his will. 51 C.J.S. Kidnapping § 1 (1947). Child stealing generally refers to the forcible
or fraudulent taking of a child from the person having the lawful custody of the child. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-320.1 (1969). It appears that child stealing statutes protect parents and
guardians against the malicious deprivation of their right to the custody of their children. In
contrast, kidnapping statutes are designed to protect the victim against forcible abduction.
41. See Annot., 77 A.L.R. 317, 320-23 (1932). At one time, the Illinois Criminal Code
excluded parents from its sanctions unless the abduction was in violation of a court order. Law
of June 27, 1923, § 166, 1923 I11. Laws 318 (repealed 1977). However, the Illinois legislature
repealed the exemption in 1961 making parents criminally responsible for all abductions. The
statute no longer differentiates between parental violations of custody decrees and abductions of
children in the absence of a court order.
42. Evidence of such a practice is provided by judicial treatment of parents who arrange to
have their children deprogrammed after conversion to alien religious cults. Not only have the
courts dismissed complaints filed against parents and their agents (the deprogrammers) for kid-
napping and false imprisonment, but the judiciary has upheld parental rights to control and
custody of a child who has reached the age of majority. Notwithstanding deprivation of liberty
interests and First Amendment freedoms, it has resorted to the use of court orders of conser-
vatorship, guardianship, and writs of habeas corpus to deliver converts from the "clutches of the
cults." See Kelley, Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, 4 C.L. REv. 23, 27 (July /Aug. 1977);
Comment, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by Their Parents, 80 DICK. L. REV. 305, 311 n.45
(1976); Note, People v. Religious Cults: Legal Guidelines for Criminal Activities, Tort Liability,
and Parental Remedies, 11 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1025, 1046-57 (1977). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 212.4 (1962). Under this provision, it is an affirmative defense to claim a legal right to
custody, even if the abduction was in violation of a custody decree. It is sufficient to plead that
the abducting parent "believed that his action was was necessary to preserve the child from
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doctrine of parens patriae 4' and natural parental rights to custody44
compels the state court into which the abducting parent brings the
child to disregard the parental misconduct and to exercise jurisdiction
when the child's welfare demands it.4 5
Legalized kidnapping and parental violations of custody decrees
also are encouraged by principles of concurrent jurisdiction. 46  In
Sommer, the court impliedly recognized that allowing parties to waive
jurisdictional objections would promote forum shopping.47 By simply
showing a change in circumstances which affects the child's welfare, 48
danger to its welfare." Id. This requirement is one easily met and, consequently, a parent can
successfully insulate himself from prosecution.
43. A state's jurisdiction to regulate the care, custody, and control of minor children found
within its territory is derived from the power that every sovereignty possesses to determine the
status of every child within its borders and the custody that will best meet his needs and wants.
The jurisdiction of the state to do so does not depend upon the domicile of the child, but only
his residence within the state. See People v. Wingate, 376 I11. 244, 33 N.E.2d 467 (1941); In re
Smythe, 65 I11. App.2d 431, 213 N.E.2d 609 (5th Dist. 1965); Winslow v. Lewis, 15 Ill. App.2d
65, 144 N.E.2d 782 (2d Dist. 1957).
44. In modification proceedings complicated by child snatching, courts generally focus on
the parent's natural desire to exercise custody and control over the children rather than the
violation of the child's personal liberties. See Wilborn v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 828, 830, 337
P.2d 65, 66 (1959); State v. Nelson, 322 Mich. 262, 268 33 N.W.2d 786, 788 (1948); State v.
Elliot, 171 La. 306, 311, 131 So. 28, 30 (1930). Therefore, many cases are dismissed for lack of
unlawful intent. See State v. Switzer, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 12, 157 N.E.2d 466 (Findlay Mun. Ct.
1956). Violation of a temporary custody decree does not result in criminal prosecution because
those decrees do not cut off parental custody rights. See Adams v. State, 218 Ga. 130, 126
S.E.2d 624 (1962). Even if subject to an adverse decree of permanent custody, a parent may
defend a kidnapping charge by claiming ignorance of the fact that the right to custody had been
judicially determined. See Hicks v. State, 158 Tenn. 204, 12 S.W.2d 385 (1928).
45. See Comment, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by Their Parents, 80 DICK. L. REv.
305, 319-20 (1976).
46. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Reason v. the
Restatement, 51 MICH. L. REV. 345 (1953); Comment, Legalized Kidnapping of Children by
Their Parents, 80 DICK. L. REV. 305, 314-15 (1976); Comment, The Jurisdiction of Texas
Courts in Interstate Child Custody Disputes: A Functional Approach, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1008
(1975).
47. Cf. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 II1. App.2d 295, 299, 222 N.E.2d 340, 342 (4th Dist. 1966)
(rejecting the allocation of jurisdiction based on domicile, the court adopted the single court
theory of jurisdiction to prevent forum shopping).
48. Courts and legal commentators alike have noted that a finding of changed circumstances
is ':one easily made when a court is so inclined." Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 492, 77 A. 1,
6 (1910). See also A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 87, at 289-90
(1962); Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 345, 352
(1953); Stumberg, Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. CHm. L. REV. 42, 57 (1940);
Note, Domestic Relations-Criminal Sanctions Against "Child-Snatching" in North Carolina,
55 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (1977).
Taylor, supra note 6, states that a finding of changed circumstances necessitates a sufficient
change of condition in the quality of the child-custodial parent relationship, the quality of child
care, or the qualifications of the custodial parent. Changes in the non-custodial parent's qualifi-
cations are considered to be insufficient alone. Great weight is attached to continuity and mod-
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a fugitive parent, prior to Sommer, could bring the child into another
county of the state and enlist the sympathies of that county's court to
modify the decree. Guided by its obligation to secure the best inter-
ests of the child under the doctrine of parens patriae, a court often
will reverse the order of its decisions by first deciding the merits of
the controversy and later justifying its exercise of jurisdiction.4 9 How-
ever, it is unlikely that this "seize and run" 50 procedure ever could
ensure stability in a child's environment. By increasing the number of
courts with jurisdiction to modify a custody decree, modification of
that decree becomes more likely. Consequently, an absolutist ap-
proach was taken by the majority in Sommer.
The court's position in Sommer is based on the same concern for
stability that led the Illinois legislature to enact Section 601 of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. 51 It in effect
codifies Section 3 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) which provides for the allocation of jurisdiction in an in-
terstate dispute. 52  Under the act, jurisdiction is based generally on
(1) the child's home state, (2) significant connection with and substan-
tial evidence within the state, or (3) physical presence in cases of
ification is only allowed when needed to promote the child's welfare. Id. at 528. See also Kjel-
lesvik v. Shannon, 41 I11. App.3d 674, 355 N.E.2d 120 (3d Dist. 1976) (custody decree may be
modified where custodian subsequently remarries one who suffers from mental illness and there
is an absence of evidence that such individual has recovered); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 10 I11.
App.3d 980, 295 N.E.2d 347 (4th Dist. 1973) (change of condition sufficient to warrant modifica-
tion where mother moved often, was unemployed, and became intoxicated in front of children
on several occasions); Kline v. Kline, 57 I11. App.2d 244, 205 N.E.2d 775 (1st Dist. 1965)
(modification proper where mother's second husband had not provided a suitable home).
In solving these problems Illinois courts have not simply applied moral judgments. Taylor,
supra note 6, at 528. See Fears v. Fears, 5 I1l. App.3d 610, 283 N.E.2d 709 (5th Dist. 1972)
(marijuana use is not in itself sufficient to warrant a change of custody); Jayroe v. Jayroe, 58 I11.
App.2d 79, 206 N.E.2d 266 (4th Dist. 1965) (giving birth to an illegitimate child by mother who
has custody is not itself sufficient basis for modification).
The safeguards ensured by a rule structure which requires a finding of changed cir-
cumstances to prevent unwarranted modification may be lost following the court's decision in
McDonald v. McDonald, 13 I11. App.3d 87, 299 N.E.2d 787 (4th Dist. 1973). There is concern
that in some circumstances the interest of the child will be subordinated and stability and
continuity impaired since the court announced that:
where custody is awarded upon the stipulation of the parties and the court receives
no evidence upon the best interests of the child or children, the court does not, in
fact, exercise judicial discretion in awarding custody and .. . the rule that a custody
order is subject to modification only if there is a substantial change of condition
affecting the child's welfare does not apply.
Id. at 89, 299 N.E.2d at 789.
49. H. CLARKE, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 11.5, at 320 (1968).
50. See generally Hudak, supra note 33.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 601 (1977).
52. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a).
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emergency. An examination of the Uniform Act's provisions discloses
the intent of its authors: to ensure the best interests of the child by
avoiding jurisdictional competition which has in the past resulted in
the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effect on their
well-being. 53 Section 3(b) makes clear that residence or physical pre-
sence alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court. 54 Fur-
thermore, the jurisdiction of the child's home state continues for a
six-month period following his or her removal from that state.
55
Taken together, the two provisions make it unlikely that an abducting
parent will gain any advantage in removing a child from the state
with custody jurisdiction.5 6 Consequently, current Illinois legislation
eliminates the incentive in an interstate conflict to seek a sympathetic
forum, 5 7 just as the Sommer case eliminates the incentive in an in-
trastate dispute.
THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
While focusing on the best interests of the child, the court in
Sommer implicitly recognized the importance of stability and preven-
tion of child snatching as objectives to be secured in allocating juris-
diction. Hence, the majority refused to allow waiver. However, three
justices dissented 58 and took an opposite stand. The dissent pointed
out that not only did the Lake County court have both personal juris-
diction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the dis-
53. Section 1 sets forth the general purpose of the Act: (1) to avoid jurisdictional competi-
tion; (2) to promote cooperation among states to insure correct decision making; (3) to eliminate
principles of concurrent jurisdiction; (4) to insure stability of home environment and secure
family relationships; (5) to deter abductions; (6) to avoid re-litigation; (7) to facilitate enforcement
of decrees of other states; and (8) to expand exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance. Id. § 1.
54. Id. § 3(b). But see A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 87-89,
at 288-300 (1962); Stansbury, supra note 1; Stumberg, supra note 1. All argue for the elimina-
tion of legalistic formulas and the acceptance of a fluid jurisdictional concept based on parens
patriae.
55. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(1).
56. See Bodenheimer, supra note 26, at 1241-42. See also Commissioner's Note, UNIFORM
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3.
57. In addition, the UCCJA incorporates the "clean hands doctrine." Id. § 8. Section 8(b)
dictates that an exercise of jurisdiction will be declined if an abducting parent petitions the
court to modify a custody decree after improperly removing the child from the care and control
of the person entitled to custody. However, the opposite result is achieved if required in the
interest of the child. The well-being of the child will not be sacrificed only to effectively punish
the abducting parent. See Reddig v. Reddig, 12 I11. App.3d 1009, 299 N.E.2d 353 (3d Dist.
1973); Commissioner's Note, UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 8.
58. Sommer v. Borovic, 69 Ill.2d 220, 236, 370 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (1977) (Clark, Moran and
Dooley, JJ., dissenting).
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pute, but that the defendant failed to make a timely objection based
on the continuing jurisdiction of the DuPage County court, and
therefore consented to the Lake County court's jurisdiction. 59
In support of its position, the dissent relied upon State ex rel.
Beineke v. Littell.60  In this decision, the Indiana Supreme Court
held that the county court issuing the original custody decree had lost
its subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute when the mother con-
sented to the jurisdiction of another Indiana county court which is-
sued an order appointing a guardian for her child. 61 Such waiver of
jurisdictional objections is an "outgrowth of judicial abhorrence ...of
a person's taking inconsistent positions and gaining advantages." 62 A
party is foreclosed from objecting to the court's jurisdiction over his
59. Generally speaking, a party's consent to the court's jurisdiction is sufficient to confer
personal jurisdiction. See A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27(2); F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.6, at 626-27 (1965).
60. 247 Ind. 686, 220 N.E.2d 521 (1966). The dissent's reliance on this case may be impro-
per. The Indiana Supreme Court unequivocally stated that the Morgan County court had the
"same jurisdiction of the subject matter of guardianships and custody of children as that of the
Marion Superior Court." Id. at 690, 220 N.E.2d at 523 (emphasis added). Nowhere does the
court use the word "exclusive" to characterize the jurisdiction of the decretal court. Instead, it
simply states that "the court granting the divorce and fixing custody of the children has con-
tinuing jurisdiction thereof." Id. at 690, 220 N.E.2d at 523 (emphasis added).
Whether Indiana case law recognizes the decretal court's jurisdiction as being continuing
and exclusive is unclear. Julian v. Julian, 60 Ind. App. 520, 111 N.E. 196 (2d Dist. 1916),
suggests that the jurisdiction of the decretal court may be exclusive in the sense that a defen-
dant in a modification proceeding in Indiana does not have the right not to be sued in any court
other than the county court of his residence. See also State v. Greene Circuit Court, 245 Ind.
1, 195 N.E.2d 776 (1964), where motion was granted to certify the cause back to decretal court
after an agreement between litigants to change venue to a different county court. The court
based its decision on the notion that divorce court must be deemed to have " full and continu-
ing' "jurisdiction to make necessary modifications. Id. at 3, 195 N.E.2d at 777, quoting Stone
v. Stone, 158 Ind. 628, 632, 64 N.E. 86, 87 (1902) (emphasis added by Greene Circuit Court).
In either case, the distinction appears to be a matter of degree. Understandably, decision
making in a child custody dispute is governed by vague and indefinite concepts and standards to
ensure a maximum amount of flexibility. While the majority in Sommer grounds its decision on
an attempt to secure the best interests of the child, the court in Beineke felt waiver of jurisdic-
tional objections posed no threat to a child's welfare. What is necessary, in the discretion of one
court, to promote the best interests of the child may not be necessary in the discretion of
another.
61. State ex rel. Beineke v. Littell, 247 Ind. 686, 691-92, 220 N.E.2d 521, 524 (1966).
Originally, a Marion County, Indiana court granted a couple a divorce and awarded custody of
their minor son to the mother. The mother subsequently consented to the appointment of a
guardian for the child by a court in Morgan County. She thereafter petitioned for dissolution of
the guardianship and, being unsuccessful, later attacked the exercise of jurisdiction by the Mor-
gan County court in an original action filed with the Indiana Supreme Court seeking a writ of
prohibition.
62. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 116, 105 N.W. 563, 566 (1905).
SOMMER V. BOROVIC 867
person if that party invoked the jurisdiction of the court 63 or filed a
general appearance and litigated the matter on its merits. 64
As the dissent in Sommer suggests, allowing waiver even in custody
modification proceedings is not without its advantages. A venue con-
venient to both parents is likely to ensure a full adversary proceed-
ing. 65 If a defendant consents to the jurisdiction of a court other
than the decretal court, that court is presumably convenient for the
defendant. Since a full adversary proceeding increases the availability
of relevant evidence, the probability of correct decision making is in-
creased as well. 66 Also enhanced is the respect for, and con-
sequently the effectiveness of a decision made by a court whose au-
thority is recognized by both parties. 67
THE MAJORITY'S POSITION: AN APPROPRIATE RESULT
It is evident that the court in Sommer was faced with the desirabil-
ity of both approaches and the inability to secure the advantages of
63. See Stewart v. Stewart, 231 I11. App. 159 (lst Dist. 1923) (court denied complainant's
motion to vacate an order granting defendant-cross-complainant a divorce for defendant's alleged
failure to meet residency requirements); Sterl v. Sterl, 2 I11. App. 223 (1st Dist. 1902) (comp-
lainant estopped from challenging the court's jurisdiction to hear and determine all equities
when court permitted defendant to file a cross-bill in the divorce action).
64. See South Park Comm'rs v. Phillips, 27 IU1. App. 380 (lst Dist. 1888) (defendant's ans-
wer to an intervening petition to enforce an equitable lien precluded defendant from raising
issue of lack of jurisdiction). Consent expressed by the filing of a general appearance may extend
beyond the original complaint to claims by the same plaintiff stated in amendments. Moreover,
a special appearance filed for the limited purpose of contesting jurisdiction may be of the same
consequence as a general appearance. For example, error in ruling against the defendant on
objection is usually waived by defendant's participation in further proceedings. See Freesen v.
Scott County Drainage & Levee Dist., 238 II1. 536, 119 N.E. 625 (1918) (where defendant
appeared generally and went to trial on merits, the benefit gained by entry of his previous
special appearance was waived); Mueller v. Mueller, 36 Ill. App.2d 305, 183 N.E.2d 887 (1st
Dist. 1962) (defendant converted his special appearance into a general appearance by raising
defense of statute of limitations).
65. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 819. Legal commentators have noted that a satisfactory
solution to the problem of allocating child custody jurisdiction can never be found as long as the
controversies are litigated within the framework of an adversary system. The latter is designed
to preserve the rights and duties of litigants rather than to investigate the best interests of the
child. Instead, it has been suggested that custody determinations be made in "extralitigious
proceedings" instituted by the state as parens patriae in disregard of the resistance or coopera-
tion of feuding parents. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Rea-
son v. The Restatement, 51 MICH. L. REv. 345, 372 (1953).
The drafters of the UCCJA also warn "that jurisdiction exists only if it is in the child's
interest, not merely the interest or the convenience of the feuding parents .. ." Commis-
sioner's Note, UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3. They maintain that submis-
sion of the contestants to a forum is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction unless additional factors
demonstrating closer ties with the forum are established.
66. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 819. See also Comment, The Jurisdiction of Texas Courts
in Interstate Child Custody Disputes: A Functional Approach, 54 TEX. L. REv. 1008 (1975).
67. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 820.
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each. Having balanced competing objectives, the court has taken a
course that will effectively further the child's welfare. Since the court
gave priority to the objectives of certainty of tribunal, stal~ility, and
prevention of parental violations of custody decrees, it will fail to gain
maximum accessibility to relevant evidence. However, while the lat-
ter can be seen as a tremendous obstacle to correct decision making
within the framework of an interstate conflict, it should not be as
great a concern within any one state. The distance between tribunal
and evidence is likely to be reduced and the spirit of cooperation in
procuring the evidence increased. Furthermore, the possibility of
transferring a case from one court to another when the need arises
becomes a more realistic alternative within the jurisdiction of a single
state.
The court's decision will not necessarily provide a convenient
forum for the litigants. Yet the court has little concern for the inter-
ests of the feuding parents when the child's welfare is at stake.
Moreover, there is little risk that the adversariness of the proceedings
will suffer. Where the care and control of minor children is at stake,
parents will not easily be dissuaded from pursuing their natural pa-
rental rights to custody. Finally, while the rule allowing waiver is
found in many adversarial proceedings, custody proceedings are not
truly adversarial. It is the child's best interests that are at issue and
the case is not viewed as being one in which a plaintiff is pitted
against a defendant. Accordingly, the parties' actions, such as waiver,
are irrelevant. It is for this reason that the majority refused to allow
waiver and therefore differed with the dissenters.
CONCLUSION
Ignoring the great degree of mobility in society today, 68 the Illinois
Supreme Court in Sommer took an absolutist approach and refused to
allow litigants in a child custody dispute to waive jurisdictional objec-
tions and consent to the jurisdiction of another county court. The best
interest of the child necessarily takes priority over the convenience of
the feuding parents. Depriving any county court other than the de-
cretal court of concurrent jurisdiction to modify a custody decree will
reduce the likelihood of modification and thereby increase stability of
environment and affection relationships. Moreover, the incentive to
68. Sommer v. Borovic, 69 II.2d 220, 236, 370 N.E.2d 1028, 1034 (1977) (Clark, Moran and
Dooley, JJ., dissenting).
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forum shop is eliminated and, hence, the temptation to "seize and
run" with the already victimized child in a custody dispute is
minimized. The court's concern for child welfare as it is affected by
procedural formalities could lead to no other result.
Janice E. Bellington

